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LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927-60. By Laura Kalman.t 
Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press. 
1986. Pp. xii, 314. $35.00. 
George C Christie 2 
As its title implies, this book is to a large extent a history of 
Yale Law School. To a lesser extent it is a history of Harvard Law 
School during the same period and of Columbia Law School before 
1928 when Young Berryman Smith was chosen over Herman Oli-
phant to succeed Huger Jervey as dean. The struggle over the dean-
ship was the event that precipitated the exodus from Columbia of 
William 0. Douglas, Hessel Yntema, Leon Marshall, Underhill 
Moore, and Oliphant. Even taken simply as a history of these insti-
tutions, the book is not without interest. It is fascinating to learn 
that William 0. Douglas was paid a salary of $14,000 in the aca-
demic year 1932-33 when he was not quite thirty-five and that, at 
about the same time, he had turned down an offer of $20,000 a year 
from the University of Chicago. As the value of money has de-
clined by a factor of more than nine since then, a contemporary law 
teacher can only react with amazement and envy. Details of the 
decanal succession struggles and the internecine squabbles among 
professors at all three schools provide not only titillation but also 
comforting assurance that a prior generation of law teachers had 
every bit as much clay in their feet as those of the present day. 
I 
Professor Kalman relates how legal realism-with its roots in 
Holmes's view of law as the prediction of judicial decisions which 
were ultimately grounded in policy and Pound's emphasis on law as 
an instrument of social engineering3-received its first development 
at Columbia and then moved practically en masse to Yale where it 
reached its zenith. At Yale, so the story continues, legal realism 
eventually lost its impetus, while at Harvard, which initially almost 
completely rejected realism, many aspects of the realists' program 
were eventually adopted. In 1960 when the story ends, we are 
I. Associate Professor of History, University of California, Santa Barbara. 
2. James B. Duke Professor of Law, Duke University. 
3. For an overview of Pound's methodological approach, see R. POUND, AN INTRo-
DUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1922). Among Pound's important early works are 
The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pts. 1 & 2-3), 24 HARV. L. REV. 591 
(1911), 25 HARV. L. REV. 140, 489 (1912); Justice According to Law (pts. 1 & 2-3), 13 
COLUM. L. REV. 696 (1913), 14 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 103 (1914). Kalman regrettably puts 
more emphasis on Holmes as an intellectual forerunner of the realists than on Pound. 
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shown that the curriculum and intellectual climate of the Harvard 
and Yale law schools had pretty much converged. 
In order to tell her story, Kalman begins by explaining what 
she means by "legal realism," a rubric that covers a very diverse set 
of phenomena: proposals for curricular reform; for shifts in the fo-
cus of law review articles and casebooks; and a variety of theoretical 
perspectives. Insofar as the phenomena are not amenable to a co-
herent synthesis, the utility of a single characterization is problem-
atic. Kalman is not unaware of the problem. Nevertheless she 
struggles to come up with something like a coherent summation of 
what realism is all about and, in the latter portion of her book, as-
sumes that she has in fact done so. 
Kalman associates legal realism with "functionalism," the view 
that the significance of the phenomena of experience is ascertained 
(in Felix Cohen's words) "'through a determination of [their] ... 
implications and consequences.' " For Kalman "[f]unctionalism 
. . . reflected an attempt to understand law in terms of its factual 
context and economic and social consequences." Functionalism 
was the converse of conceptualism, the view that law consists en-
tirely of rules and that the skill of the lawyer is the ability to reason 
logically within the universe of rules. The realists purported to be 
seeking the integration of law with the social sciences. Kalman con-
cludes, however, that "ultimately the realists did not use social and 
behavioral sciences so much to guide them in making social policy 
as to justify their skepticism about the conceptualists' rules." While 
the realists talked about wanting to study the behavior of judges, 
they rarely attempted to do so systematically. More often, "the 
realists' functionalism took the form of institutionalism," particu-
larly the form made popular by Thorstein Veblen. Veblen, writes 
Professor Kalman, exposed "the bankruptcy of classical economic 
theory ... with its assumptions of a natural order in which immuta-
ble laws had created competition and an 'economic man' who auto-
matically responded to those laws in accordance with his own self-
interest." Classical economics "was replete with meaningless ab-
stractions." According to Veblen's disciples "modern economics 
should abandon these abstractions and focus instead on societal in-
stitutions." This was the perspective that many of the legal realists 
tried to apply to law and legal institutions. They might well have 
been described as "legal institutionalists." 
Insofar as the legal realists were functionalists they were con-
cerned with process. They spent much time debunking the judicial 
process and emphasizing the great leeway allowed to judges by the 
conceptual approach to law, which disguised (sometimes even from 
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the judges themselves) the range of decisional freedom. The realists 
accordingly opposed the whole idea behind the Restatements of the 
Law, undertaken in the 1920s by the American Law Institute, 
which they viewed as an attempt to resurrect conceptualism. Func-
tionalism, as it found expression in legal realism, emphasized 
"facts." It preached that law could not be viewed in isolation from 
society. It tended toward relativism and an emphasis on the partic-
ular; it focused on the present. As has already been noted, however, 
"[t]he realists used the social sciences' functionalism chiefly to chal-
lenge traditional legal rules rather than to formulate new social pol-
icy." Indeed, the realists' enchantment with the social sciences 
faded as they came to see how little the social sciences of their day 
could contribute to the solution of the problems that concerned 
them. 
Kalman concludes that the realists largely failed to notice that 
"[a]lthough the social sciences were 'scientific' in the sense that they 
were empirical and objective, their implicit message after Freud was 
that they could not be scientific because human idiosyncrasy over-
whelmed all of the world's rules or categories. Even the most func-
tional of characterizations had to be ill-founded." In Kalman's 
words: 
Three paradoxes thus confronted legal functionalism, or legal realism. If decision 
making was inherently idiosyncratic, as the realists had shown it to be, what could 
they accomplish by pressing for it to become more efficient and certain-an objec-
tive they pursued so intently that they were willing to tolerate the judges they con-
demned over other decision makers as soon as they had discovered that judges 
offered the most efficient means of dispute resolution? If decision making was in-
herently idiosyncratic, what could they gain by taking conceptualistically defined 
legal rules and redefining them functionally? If it was inherently idiosyncratic, 
what could they prove with their empirical studies, which the social sciences taught 
could easily be rationalized away? Given the idiosyncrasy factor, how could a self-
consciously 'functional' judge, who relied on the empirical data the realists gath-
ered, produce a decision that would increase legal certainty and efficiency? Reality 
threatened realism. 
In several places in the book Kalman goes even further in stressing 
that exposing the idiosyncratic nature of judicial decisionmaking, its 
dependence on the personal preferences of the decisionmaker, was 
the principal intellectual legacy of realism. Indeed, she describes 
Jerome Frank as "the father of legal realism." Kalman finds it 
ironic that "realism seemed to lead only to judicial legislation." 
Why then did so many of the realists want to become judges? Kal-
man suggests that the "intense professionalization" they had under-
gone "motivated [some ofj them to trade in their skepticism for 
judicial robes." Others "perhaps . . . believed that, having exposed 
judges for what they were, they could engage in judicial legislation 
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with a clear conscience when they became judges. Certainly Wil-
liam 0. Douglas did."4 
Kalman concludes that in their day-to-day work most realists 
"seemed blissfully unaware of functionalism's internal contradic-
tions." They tried to apply a realistic approach to legal education 
as well as to legal scholarship. While in their scholarship and gen-
eral discussions of legal education they assumed that the integration 
of law and the social sciences was a vital part of functionalism, their 
specific programs for legal education in the 1920s and 1930s "more 
frequently treated the integration of law with the social sciences and 
functionalism as two separate goals." They thus embarked on a 
whole series of "law and" social science courses, which were not 
very popular with students, while at the same time they tried to 
make the traditional courses more functional. Courses on bills and 
notes, banking, sales, etc., were combined into a course on "com-
mercial transactions." Partnerships, corporations, and agency were 
combined into "business associations." There were also attempts, 
not always successful, to organize courses around problems. The 
key tools in this endeavor were the new casebooks being produced 
by the realists. There was some attempt to bring social science 
learning to bear on these newly structured courses; the new 
casebooks became "Cases and Materials on . . . . " rather than 
merely "Cases on .... " Nevertheless, Kalman concludes that the 
change was mostly cosmetic; the social science materials were mini-
mal and not carefully integrated into the legal materials. Kalman 
believes that Jerome Michael and Herbert Wechsler's Criminal Law 
and Its Administration, published in 1940, was the first casebook 
"that integrated law with social science." Since then similar efforts 
have appeared. Kalman mentions with approval several casebooks 
prepared by Yale Law School faculty in the immediate post-World 
War II period. By this time, paradoxically, realism as an intellec-
tual force was largely spent. 
II 
Throughout the book there is the suggestion that the realists 
did not go far enough, that they should have tried more vigorously 
(and rigorously) to carry out their program for the reform of legal 
institutions and legal education. According to Kalman, one of the 
realist innovations in legal education that might have been carried 
forward more vigorously involved administrative law courses focus-
ing on specific problems before specific agencies. If memory serves 
4. LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 43. 
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me correctly, Harvard offered a seminar on FCC radio and televi-
sion licensing proceedings and on CAB route award proceedings at 
various times in the 1950s. Having practiced before the CAB in the 
late 1950s, I can verify that the task of compressing the vast records 
in these proceedings into a form that would be both manageable and 
useful to students would have been a daunting one. One could only 
admire people who tried to do it. At the time, I doubted the intel-
lectual value of the exercise. Now that deregulation has made all of 
these proceedings historical relics, the intellectual value of focusing 
on such topical problems seems even more questionable. 
The book exhibits a certain amount of naivete that I find puz-
zling. One of the principal explanations that Kalman provides for 
the failure of legal realism to accomplish more is that, even at Yale, 
the "contributions [of the realists] broadened the curriculum but 
left representation of the wealthy at its heart." Harvard, even after 
its acceptance of some of the realist program, "remained a trade 
school centered around the problems of big business and the 
wealthy." I find these statements difficult to take seriously, particu-
larly since Kalman does not say expressly what sort of legal educa-
tion would have been better. Given the way American society and 
the economy were then organized, and to a very substantial extent 
are still organized, what else could one expect? Would Kalman feel 
better if most large economic enterprises had been government 
owned and the realists had focused on governmental economic or-
ganizations? And if that would be more comforting to her, then 
what conceivable effect would it necessarily have had on the struc-
ture of law and legal education? Publicly owned economic units 
have legal problems very much like those of non-governmental eco-
nomic units and their managements do not behave much differently 
than the managements of large non-governmental organizations 
owned by a large, amorphous class of shareholders.s If, on the 
other hand, the point Kalman wishes to make is that the realists 
were oblivious to the problems of the common man, then she is 
mistaken. Certainly in working for the reform and regulation of the 
securities industry-activities which Kalman herself refers to in her 
book-people like William 0. Douglas, Jerome Frank and Abe For-
tas thought they were working for the benefit of what they believed 
5. If civil rights was not the burning issue in the 1920s and 1930s that it was in the 
1940s and 1950s (when incidentally, as Kalman notes, id. at 194-200, many Yale Law School 
faculty members took courageous positions during the "Red Scare") that does not reftect on 
legal realism. It is anachronistic to castigate people for not having the concerns of a later 
day. Likewise, it does not seem to be noteworthy that the older realists "tended to be middle 
class intellectuals." See Hazard, Rising Above Principle, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 153, 174 (1986). 
What else are university professors but middle class intellectuals? 
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to be the common man. And one must not forget Jerome Frank's 
role in establishing the federally protected right of labor to engage 
in collective bargaining. Indeed, both securities regulation and 
collective bargaining became important parts of the law school 
curriculum. 
I would have preferred a more thorough discussion of the intel-
lectual underpinnings of legal realism. Professor Kalman's sugges-
tion that legal realism's main legacy was its emphasis on the 
idiosyncratic nature of judicial decisionmaking is much too simplis-
tic. The development of legal realism was just one reflection of the 
vast social and intellectual ferment that Western civilization in gen-
eral, and the United States in particular, were undergoing at the 
turn of the twentieth century. One factor that had an enormous 
effect on legal education and legal scholarship was the change in the 
nature of the "big-time" practice of law. This was the period in 
which the Cravath, Swaine & Moores and Sullivan & Cromwells 
were developing, a period in which law firms were helping to create 
United States Steel, Bethlehem Steel, and Westinghouse Electric 
Corporation.6 The major New York law firms were becoming insti-
tutions, and not merely associations of lawyers practicing together. 
More important, these law firms were entering into continuing, in-
stitutional if you will, relationships with large corporate entities. 
Instead of being someone who was consulted occasionally when liti-
gation flared, the New York corporate lawyer and his law firm were 
regular participants in the on-going business decisions of their cli-
ents. Some of the more eminent members of the bar became inti-
mately and prominently involved in matters of business policy and 
strategy.7 The corporate lawyer had to provide a legal structure 
through which his client could achieve its business objectives. In 
helping to organize huge conglomerations of capital, he had to 
chart a course between the Scylla of state corporate law and the 
Charybdis of burgeoning federal regulation, particularly the Sher-
man Antitrust Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914. The cor-
6. The Cravath firm's association with Bethlehem Steel began in 1903. I R. SWAINE, 
THE CRAVATH FIRM 693-704 (1946). For a detailed description of the firm's involvement 
with Bethlehem Steel see 2 R. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM (1948). Paul Cravath started 
representing Westinghouse in the late 1880s. I id. at 588-89, 649-50. References to the firm's 
involvement with Westinghouse are scattered throughout the remainder of Volume I and 
throughout Volume 2. 
7. The reorganization of Bethlehem Steel between 1901-06 makes interesting reading 
and shows the prominent part played by many leading New York lawyers in the process. I 
R. SWAINE, supra note 6 at 693-704. Paul Cravath's involvement in the reorganization of the 
Westinghouse Companies in 1907-08 and the resulting fight over control is particularly worth 
reading. 2 R. SWAINE, supra note 6, at 32-45. Cf C. MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 288-90 
(1956). 
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porate lawyer was interested in constructing organizational forms 
that would last. He was therefore enormously interested in making 
long-term predictions about official behavior. From the point of 
view of this type of lawyer, law was a set of predictions of judicial 
behavior. 
At the same time that the nature of legal practice in the large 
urban centers was changing, the study of human behavior was be-
coming a major focus of intellectual activity. Kalman makes a brief 
reference to John Watson, perhaps the best-known figure in the de-
velopment of behavioral psychology as a major academic field in the 
United States. Both Watson and the more recently acclaimed B.F. 
Skinner were influenced in tum by the work of the Russian Ivan 
Petrovich Pavlov.s Given the important changes in the nature of 
large-firm legal practice and the contemporaneous emergence of be-
havioral psychology, it is not surprising that a behavioral approach 
to legal scholarship interested a significant group of academic law-
yers at elite law schools. 
In her discussion, Kalman treats legal realism as an American 
phenomenon. She does not discuss or even mention the important 
European antecedents to realism.9 Nor is there any mention of what 
are generally called the Scandinavian legal realists. They include 
the Swedes, Axel Hagerstrom, 10 A. V. Lundstedt, 11 and Karl 
Olivecrona,12 and the Dane, A1f Ross.B These were very sophisti-
cated men who applied a behavioral perspective to legal problems in 
a much more systematic and rigorous fashion than their American 
counterparts. 
Ross eventually attempted to define law itself in terms of a pre-
dictive model. Following a suggestion of H.L.A. Haft,14 based on 
the distinction between the external and internal points of view, it 
has become fashionable to dismiss the work of the Scandinavian 
8. An interesting discussion of Pavlov's work and its effect on major figures in Ameri-
can behavioral psychology such as Watson and Skinner is contained in II INT'L. ENCYC. OF 
THE SociAL SciENCES 480-87 (1968). 
9. See, e.g., Herget & Wallace, The German Free Law Movement as the Source of 
American Legal Realism, 73 VA. L. REv. 399 (1987). Roscoe Pound, who was profoundly 
influenced by von Ihering (1818-92) and Ehrlich (1862-1922), was an important figure in 
introducing to American legal scholars the work of these and other continental scholars. 
10. See A. HAGERSTROM (1969-1939), INQUIRIES INTO THE NATURE OF LAW AND 
MoRAlS (C. Broad trans. 1953). 
11. A. LUNDSTEDT (1882-1955), LEGAL THINKING REVISED (1956). 
12. K. 0LIVECRONA, LAW As FACT (2d ed. 1971); LAW As FACT (1939). Despite the 
common title and underlying theme these are really two different books. 
13. A. Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE (1956) (first published in Danish in 1953); To-
WARDS A REALISTIC JURISPRUDENCE (A. Fausboll trans. 1946). See a/so Ross, Tu-Tu, 70 
HARV. L. REv. 812 (1957). 
14. Hart, Scandinavian Legal Realism, 1959 CAMB. L.J. 233. This was a review of A. 
Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE, supra note 13. 
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realists as irrelevant because it is based on a logical fallacy. Hart 
argued that, from the internal position of the judge (as opposed to 
the external position of an outside observer, such as a scholar), it is 
logically impossible to consider law as a set of predictions. A judge, 
after all, is engaged in the enterprise of deciding particular cases, 
not of predicting how he would decide these cases. The judge is 
concerned with ascertaining what rules of law are binding upon him 
and what other factors, if any, he should take into account in mak-
ing his decision. In other words, deciding is different from predict-
ing, particularly in a normative context in which the judge is 
concerned with determining what he should do. I have elsewhere 
argued that Hart's criticism, which was immediately accepted as 
the definitive criticism of this aspect of realism, is much too glib. Is 
There are important ways in which a predictive approach to law 
can be applied even to the perspective of a judge of a court of last 
resort. This of course is not the place to continue that discussion. 
What is important for present purposes is that Kalman ignores 
some of the questions raised by legal realism, as well as various as-
pects of the social and intellectual environment in which legal real-
ism arose. 
III 
Legal realism has left many important legacies. Most legally 
trained people now accept that there is a fair amount of indetermi-
nacy in the law. The realists' concern with process continues to the 
present day.16 The realists were also concerned with facts. As Kal-
man intimates, Herman Oliphant seems to have subscribed to the 
view that if one really knew all the facts underlying a legal problem, 
the correct solution would be apparent, at least to a person who had 
the requisite understanding of society and knowledge of the social 
sciences. 11 A similar faith appears in the work of Karl Llewellyn. Is 
In its less extreme forms this stress on the primacy of factual con-
15. Christie, The Universal Audience and Predictive Theories of Law, 5 LAW & PHIL 
343 (1986). 
16. Kalman describes the more modern concern with legal process "as a reaction 
against legal realism." LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 223. That may well be. The realists were 
interested in examining the operation of the legal process as a prolegomenon to reform. 
Scholars like Henry Hart and Albert Sacks (the authors of the influential but "unpublished" 
The Legal Process (mimeograph ed. 1958)) were interested in legal process as a means for 
providing, through process, an objective element in judicial decisionmaking. LEGAL REAL-
ISM YALE 220-24. 
17. Oliphant, A Return To Stare Decisis (pts. 1-2), 14 A.B.A. J. 71, !59 (1928). Kalman 
seems to suggest that Oliphant viewed the judges' response to the facts as fitting into a stimu-
lus/reaction mold. Oliphant rather viewed it as the application of the common sense of a 
man of the world to particular social problems. In the world of the early common-law judges 
the method might be characterized as "intuitive empiricism." /d. at 160. In the hands of a 
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siderations manifested itself in the promotion of balancing tests (or 
in the jargon of social sciences, factor analysis) as a judicial deci-
sionmaking technique. It is ironic, in view of the realists' hostility 
to restatements, that, in some of the Restatement (Seconds), an at-
tempt has been made to enshrine factor analysis as the paradigm of 
judicial decisionmaking. Nowhere is the contrast more marked 
than in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts.l9 One imagines Jo-
seph Beale writhing in his grave. Factor analysis also intrudes into 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.2o 
To perceive this legacy is not necessarily to applaud it. One 
does not have to subscribe to a Bealean view of law to appreciate 
some of the very great difficulties that arise from the attempt to 
utilize factor analysis in judicial decisionmaking.21 
Finally, one might note that the timid suggestion of the realists 
to add social scientists and philosophers to law school faculties has 
now become fashionable. For the most part the realists envisaged 
these non-lawyers as teaching advanced courses and seminars, often 
of the "Law and --" kind. Now, however, one can find non-
lawyers who teach basic first year courses like Torts and Con-
tracts.22 No one doubts that able people from other disciplines, par-
ticularly philosophy and literary criticism, can rigorously dissect a 
written opinion. They can also bring fresh insights from their re-
spective disciplines. For example, one cannot ignore the contribu-
tions that economists have made to our understanding of the effects 
of legal regulation. The only reservation that I have about the use 
of nonlawyers as law school teachers is that a case, though it may 
appear in a Torts casebook, often raises problems from several other 
fields of law-constitutional law, procedure, etc. I should think 
that only a lawyer would have the necessary background to identify 
these related problems and indicate to the students how they relate 
to the case at hand. Upper class students can do some but not all of 
modem jurist trained in the social sciences the method would become "not merely a con-
scious empiricism, but also a methodical one." /d. at 161. 
18. See also K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 
183, 222-23 (1960). 
19. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS,§§ 6(2), 145(2), 188(2) (1971). 
20. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 520 (1977). See also§§ 826(b) and 
829A. 
21. See Christie, An Essay On Discretion, 1986 DUKE L.J. 747, 765·12. 
22. In the University of Virginia Law School catalog for the academic year 1985-86 (p. 
80), Professor Charles Goetz, an economist, is listed as teaching one of seven sections of 
Contracts. In the Yale Law School catalog for the academic year 1982-83 (p. 37), Professor 
Alvin Klevorick, an economist, is listed as teaching a small section of Torts. Likewise, in the 
Yale Law School catalog for the academic year 1985-86 (p. 31), Professor Jules Coleman, a 
philosopher, is listed as teaching a small section of Torts. 
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this themselves. I am skeptical of the ability of first year students to 
do so. 
Let me conclude by stating that Kalman's discussion of the 
intellectual background of legal realism is interesting, though not as 
deep or comprehensive as I would have liked. The principal value 
of her book is as an institutional history of Yale Law School. Any-
one interested in that subject will find Kalman's book essential 
reading. 
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE 
AND PROCEDURE. By Ronald D. Rotunda,t John E. No-
wak,2 and J. Nelson Young.3 St. Paul, Mn.: West Publishing 
Co. 1986. 3 Volumes, $240.00. 
Ralph A. Rossum 4 
Most revised editions of constitutional treatises and casebooks 
are merely updates of the previous edition, with only marginal 
changes made in the bulk of the text. But there are exceptions. In 
the process of revising the second edition of their constitutional 
treatise, Professors Ronald Rotunda, John Nowak, and J. Nelson 
Young have gone from 1317 pages of material in a single volume to 
2581 pages in three volumes. They thereby confirmed their fear, 
expressed in the first edition, that it "may be impossible to prepare a 
single volume treatise on Constitutional law." 
The authors state that their purpose is to provide an up-to-date 
summary and analysis of the principal areas of constitutional law. 
They disclaim originality of argument: "It is far too late in the his-
tory of constitutional scholarship for the authors of a treatise such 
as this to claim full credit for the ideas presented in their work." 
Appropriately for a treatise, the organization is conventional: they 
address governmental power in Volume I and limitations on gov-
ernmental power and the protection of individual rights and liber-
ties, as secured by the Bill of Rights and the post-Civil War 
amendments, in Volumes II and III. In one of the most valuable 
features of the work, they append at the end of Volume III the Dec-
I. Professor of Law, University of Illinois. 
2. Professor of Law, University of Illinois. 
3. Late Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and Late Pro-
fessor of Law Emeritus, University of Illinois. 
4. Tuohy Professor of Government and Director of the Henry Salvatori Center for the 
Study of Freedom in the Modern World, Claremont McKenna College. 
